
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EPA Region 10 Deemed Releasable



1600 South Second Street Mount Vernon, WA 98273-5202 ph 360.428.1617 fax 360.428.1620 www.nwcleanair.org

Air Operating Permit Excess Emissions Report Form Part II

Name of Facility	Shell, Puget Sound Refinery	Reported by	Tim Figgie	
Date of notification	February 20, 2015	Incident type: breakdown/ upset/startup or shutdown	Shutdown	
Start Date February 20, 2015		Start Time:	2:30 PM	
End Date February 20, 2015		End Time:	4:30 PM	
Process unit or syster	m(s): East Flare			

Incident Description

On Friday, February 20th, at around 2pm, partially combusted gasses were released from the East Flare. An approximately 10 mph north wind carried odors toward La Conner and the Swinomish Reservation. Odor complaints were received by Shell PSR, the Anacortes 911, Northwest Clean Air Agency (NWCAA), EPA Emergency Response Unit and the Washington State Emergency Management Division.

The flare shutdown procedure began the previous day (Feb 19) when Operations started flushing 19NC6 Seal Pot and 19NC3 KO Drum by increasing the Seal Pot makeup water. The KO Drum was filled with firewater and pumped out on Thursday nightshift. Friday morning at about 8:45AM, the East Flare was blocked in and isolated from normal process flow by closing the valve upstream of the C3 KO drum.

Steam was introduced to the bottom of the KO Drum through a steam hose. This warmed up the drum enough to push vapors through the Seal Pot water level, and register at the Sulfur analyzers downstream¹. It is estimated that the temperature in the KO Drum reached approximately 140 degrees. At about 12:30pm, 250lb steam was introduced into the KO Drum vapor space through a 2 inch line. This began to heat up the water in the C6 Seal Pot. When Operators realized that the C6 Seal Pot had a water level in it, they transferred it into the KO Drum. The 200 degree water increased the temperature of the KO Drum, causing more vapors to form. With the water seal removed, the vapors that had built up in the KO Drum moved into the Flare header. Partially combusted hydrocarbons and mercaptans were released to the atmosphere.

Immediate steps taken to limit the duration and/or quantity of excess emissions:

The East Flare decontamination process was stopped upon Shell PSR learning there were impacts to the community.

Applicable air operating permit term(s): 4.3 - 4.6

Estimated Excess Emissions: Based on Engineering Estimates	Pollutant(s): Sulfur and VOC Compounds	Pounds (Estimate): detailed emission calculations are being developed and the results will be sent to NWCAA by April 10, 2015 in a separate report.
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¹ The sulfur analyzers were later shutdown at approximately 12:40PM to prevent water damage.

ENFORCEMENT CONFIDENTIAL

Air Operating Permit

Eccess Emissions Report Form Part II Page 2
The incident was the result of the following (check all that apply): Scheduled equipment startup Scheduled equipment shutdown Poor or inadequate design Careless, poor, or inadequate operation Poor or inadequate maintenance A reasonably preventable condition
Did the facility receive any complaints from the public?
No Yes (provide details below) Shell PSR received community complaints from areas south of the refinery including Swede's
Net Repair and Sales, Padilla Heights area, Shelter Bay area, the Town of La Conner and from the Swinomish Indian Tribal Community.
Did the incident result in the violation of an ambient air quality standard
No Yes (provide details below)
Root and other contributing causes of incident:
The root cause of this event was insufficient procedures were used for the decontamination of the east flare prior to venting to the atmosphere.
The root cause of the incident was: (The retention of records of all required monitoring data and support information shall be kept for a period of five years from the date of the report as per the WAC regulation (173-401-615)) Identified for the first time Identified as a recurrence (explain previous incident(s) below – provide dates) Odor complaints were received during previous flare shutdown and decontamination activities on January 24 and October 5, 2011 and on March 15, 2014.
Are the emissions from the incident exempted by the NSPS or NESHAP "malfunction" definitions below? No Yes (describe below)
Emissions occurred during shutdown of the East flare and after the flare was isolated from normal operation. There was no regular process or upset gas flow to the flare at the time of the event.

<u>Definition of NSPS "Malfunction"</u>: Any sudden, infrequent, and not reasonably preventable failure of air pollution control equipment, process equipment, or failure of a process to operate in a normal or usual manner. Failures that are caused in part by poor maintenance or careless operation are not malfunctions. 40 CFR 60.2 <u>Definition of NESHAP "Malfunction"</u>: Any sudden, infrequent, and not reasonably preventable failure of air pollution control and monitoring equipment, process equipment, or a process to operate in a normal or usual manner which causes, or has the potential to cause, the emission limitations in an applicable standard to be exceeded. Failures that are caused in part by poor maintenance or careless operation are not malfunctions. 40 CFR 63.2

Analyses of measures available to reduce likelihood of recurrence (evaluate possible design, operational, and maintenance changes; discuss alternatives, probable effectiveness, and cost; determine if an outside consultant should be retained to assist with analyses):

Page 2 of 3 BUSINESS CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

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•	Air Operating Permit					
	Excess Emissions Report Form Part II					
	Page 2					
	New procedures will be developed for future flare shutdowns and associated decontamination					
	activities, before any future planned maintenance activities. PSR will provide NWCAA the new					
	procedures once completed.					
	proceeds of the completed.					
	Description of corrective action to be taken (include commencement and completion dates):					
	See above					
	occ above					
	If correction not required, explain basis for conclusion:					
See above Attach Reports Reference Documents and Other Rackup Material as Necessary. This reset actions to						
	Attach Reports, Reference Documents, and Other Backup Material as Necessary. This report satisfies the requirements of both NWCAA regulation 340, 341, 342 and the WAC regulation (173-400-107).					
	,					
	Is the investigation continuing? ☐No ☐Yes					
	Is the source requesting additional time for completion of the report? \(\subseteq No \) \(\subseteq Yes \)					
	, and the Miles					
	Based upon information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, I certify that the statements and					
	information in this document and all referenced documents and attachments are true, accurate and					
	complete.					
	Prepared By: _ Tim Figgie Date: March 17, 2015					
	Responsible Official or Designee: Fair fun Date: 30 March 2015					
	7 //					
	/					

Page 3 of 3



Shell Oil Products US

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April 10, 2015

CERTIFIED MAIL RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED 7013 2250 0001 8744 0415

Mr. Dan Mahar NWCAA 1600 South Second Street Mount Vernon, WA 98273

Dear Mr. Mahar:

Subject: Odor Event Emissions Estimates

Shell Puget Sound Refinery is submitting the emissions estimates found in Attachment 1 as a follow-up to the Excess Emissions Report submitted to your office on March 30, 2015.

Contact Mr. Tim Figgie at 293-1525 if you have any questions related to this information.

Based on information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, I certify that the statements and information in contained in this letter are true, accurate, and complete.

Sincerely,

SHELL PUGET SOUND REFINERY

Shirley Yap

General Manager

TCF

Cc:

Air Toxics Coordinator - Office of Air Quality

US-EPA Region 10 1200 Sixth Ave Seattle, WA 98101

BUSINESS CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

Attachment 1 Emission Estimation Methodology

On line sulfur instrumentation on the East Flare had been isolated from service to avoid water damage prior to the odor release incident that occurred on February 20, 2015¹. Therefore, emissions from the flare that occurred during the flare decontamination process were estimated based on available information regarding the composition of components in the flare Knock Out (KO) drum. A process flow dynamc simulation of the flare system from the KO drum to the flare tip was constructed using Unisim simulation software. This simulation utilized the physical characteristics of Puget Sound flare system and process operating information provided by plant personnel and process control instrumentation. The output from the simulation was an estimate of the flow and chemical composition of the gas going to the flare tip.

The chemical composition of the flare gas derived from the dynamic simulation model was then used in a combustion efficiency model cited in peer review comments of the US EPA paper, "Parameters for Properly Designed and Operated Flares" (April 2012)².

Combustion efficiencies were calculated on a minute-by-minute basis during the east flare odor event. These minute-by-minute combustion efficiencies where then applied to the dynamic simulation flow and composition estimates to obtain estimates of emissions leaving the flare tip. These data are listed in Table 1 below and are total emissions for the release period from 12:50 PM to 4:18 PM on February 20, 2015.

Table 1

Estimated Emissions

H2S	Methyl mercaptan	Ethyl mercaptan	Propyl mercaptan	Dimethyl sulfide	Benzene	VOC	Methane, ethane, & hydrogen	SO2
lbs	lbs	lbs	lbs	lbs	lbs	lbs	lbs	lbs
2.3	65.6	16.2	4.4	17.9	0.9	127.7	471.0	114.5

Reportable Quantities for the above compounds, in LBS, per 40 CFR 302.

400	100	1						
100	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	10	N/A	N/A	500
						14//1	14/7	300

Anacortes, Washington

¹ The online sulfur instrumentation on the flare line had been isolated when steam was added to the flare line. This was done to protect the instrument from water damage. At the time the sulfur instrumentation was isolated from service, the east flare line had been blocked in from the main flare header and flare gas recovery so that no process flow could reach the east flare.

² The combustion efficiency expression suggested by Reviewer B of this paper was utilized to estimate combustion efficiency.